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An Uncertain Prescription—Medical Malpractice 
Actions in Louisiana 
INTRODUCTION 
Terry Warren died on October 12, 2000, as a result of heart 
problems while undergoing treatment.1 Although Mr. Warren’s 
widow and one daughter asserted wrongful death and survival 
actions against the treating physicians, the other daughter was not 
allowed to do so because the prescriptive period had expired by the 
time her claims were asserted.2 According to the Louisiana 
Supreme Court, the general codal rules of interruption of 
prescription do not apply in medical malpractice actions.3 This 
interpretation allows for the possibility that a wrongful death 
claimant’s action can prescribe before it ever accrues, even if the 
victim of malpractice timely files suit before his death, leaving the 
wrongful death plaintiff with no chance at a remedy.4 
In 1975, the Louisiana Legislature passed what is commonly 
known as the Medical Malpractice Act in an effort to curtail rising 
medical costs and insurance rates.5 Louisiana Revised Statutes 
sections 40:1299.41–.49 set forth the procedure by which medical 
malpractice actions must be asserted.6 Louisiana Revised Statutes 
section 9:5628 governs the prescriptive period for such actions.7 
Perceived conflicts between the Medical Malpractice Act and 
the Louisiana Civil Code challenge Louisiana courts, which have 
wrestled with the suspension of prescription provided by Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 40:1299.47 and the interruption of 
prescription provided by the Civil Code.8 The challenges lie in 
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 1. Warren v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 21 So. 3d 186, 203 (La. 2009). 
 2. Id. at 203, 206–08. 
 3. Borel v. Young, 989 So. 2d 42, 67 (La. 2008). 
 4. Wrongful death and survival actions do not accrue until the death of the 
decedent. See Taylor v. Giddens, 618 So. 2d 834, 840 (La. 1993); discussion 
infra Part II.B.3. 
 5. Louisiana Revised Statutes sections 40:1299.41–.49 are commonly 
known under the name “the Medical Malpractice Act.” In addition, section 
9:5628 is often included under the umbrella of “the Act.” The policies behind 
the Medical Malpractice Act were described in Kandy G. Webb, Comment, 
Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation—A First Checkup, 50 TUL. L. REV. 
655, 666 (1976). 
 6. See Taylor, 618 So. 2d at 841. 
 7. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5628 (2007). 
 8. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Lafayette Bone & Joint Clinic, 467 So. 2d 113 
(La. Ct. App. 3d. 1985), overruled by LeBreton v. Rabito, 714 So.2d 1226 (La. 
1998); Taylor, 618 So. 2d 834; LeBreton, 714 So. 2d 1226; Borel, 989 So. 2d 
42; Warren v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 21 So. 3d 186 (La. 2009). 
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determining (1) whether suspension of prescription provided in 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 40:1229.47 should preempt the 
general rules of prescription found in the Louisiana Civil Code; (2) 
whether such preemption should extend to barring relation back of 
amended petitions; and (3) whether the prescriptive period for 
wrongful death claims is governed by Louisiana Revised Statutes 
section 9:5628 or Louisiana Civil Code article 3492.9 
This Comment explores a line of cases, including LeBreton v. 
Rabito, Borel v. Young, and Warren v. Louisiana Medical Mutual 
Insurance Co., and suggests an alternative interpretation that 
would lead to results more in line with the general rules of 
prescription set forth in the Louisiana Civil Code.10 Part I provides 
a background in this area of the law by reviewing pertinent statutes 
and principles of Louisiana procedure. Part II analyzes the 
reasoning of the cases in question and criticizes certain decisions.11 
It also contrasts application of current law with an alternative 
suggested by the analysis. Part III concludes the comment, briefly 
outlining suggestions designed to eliminate the unfair procedural 
bar created in LeBreton, Borel, and Warren. The judge-made 
barrier of uninterruptible prescription in medical malpractice cases 
is bad medicine for Louisiana’s codal command, whereby the 
person at fault must repair the damage he has caused.12 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Medical Malpractice Act 
The Louisiana Legislature passed the Medical Malpractice Act13 
amid a trend of increasing numbers of medical malpractice claims 
                                                                                                             
 9. Compare Taylor, 618 So. 2d at 841 (holding that Louisiana Civil Code 
article 3492 governs the prescriptive period for wrongful death in medical 
malpractice actions), with Warren, 21 So. 3d at 207–08 (applying the 
prescriptive period set forth Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:5628 to a 
claim of wrongful death arising in medical malpractice).  
 10. LeBreton, 714 So. 2d 1226; Borel, 989 So. 2d 42; Warren, 21 So. 3d 186. 
 11. The primary cases examined are LeBreton v. Rabito, 714 So. 2d 1226 
(La. 1998); Borel v. Young, 989 So. 2d 42 (La. 2008); and Warren v. La. Med. 
Mut. Ins. Co., 21 So. 3d 186 (2009). 
 12. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (2010). 
 13. Louisiana Revised Statutes sections 40:1299.41–.49 are commonly 
known as the Medical Malpractice Act, but the discussion herein will be 
confined mostly to Act No. 808, 1975 La. Acts 1860 (enacting Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 9:5628), and Act No. 817, 1975 La. Acts 1875 
(enacting Louisiana Revised Statutes sections 40:1299.41–.49), which were 
enacted to slow the growth of rising medical costs. See E. Scott Hackenberg, 
Comment, Puttering About in a Small Land: Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5628 
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and higher damages awards, which consequently led to higher 
malpractice insurance costs and higher medical costs for patients.14 
The Act was a compromise between the public good, represented by 
lower medical costs and increased access to medical care, and the 
private harm of limiting actions in malpractice.15 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 40:1299.47 requires that all 
malpractice claims against qualified health care providers, other 
than those submitted for binding arbitration, must be reviewed by a 
medical review panel (MRP).16 The MRP procedure serves as an 
inexpensive way to filter out spurious medical malpractice 
claims.17 Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:5628 provides a 
prescriptive period of one year from the date of the commission or 
discovery of the alleged malpractice on actions for damages 
against health care providers.18 However, “in all events such 
                                                                                                             
 
and Judicial Responses to the Plight of the Medical Malpractice Victim, 50 LA. 
L. REV. 815, 815–16 (1990); see also Webb, supra note 5, at 666.  
 14. Webb, supra note 5, at 658-59. 
 15. Crier v. Whitecloud, 496 So. 2d 305, 308–9 (La. 1986) (citing Webb, 
supra note 5); Hackenberg, supra note 13, at 815–16; Marc S. Firestone, 
Comment, Prescription—What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You—Louisiana 
Adheres to a Three Year Limit on the Discovery Rule, 58 TUL. L. REV. 1547, 
1553 n.40 (1984). 
 16. Louisiana Revised Statutes section 40:1299.47 provides: “All 
malpractice claims against health care providers covered by this Part, other than 
claims validly agreed for submission to a lawfully binding arbitration procedure, 
shall be reviewed by a medical review panel established as hereinafter provided 
for in this Section.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(A)(1)(a) (Supp. 2011). 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 40:1299.42 provides the requirements for 
qualification under the Act, which include filing proof of financial responsibility 
with the Patient’s Compensation Fund Oversight Board and payment of a 
surcharge. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §40:1299.42 (Supp. 2011).  
 17. Webb, supra note 5, at 681. Negative review panel findings do not bar 
subsequent court claims. Id. 
 18. Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:5628 provides: 
No action for damages for injury or death against any [listed health care 
provider], hospital or nursing home . . . arising out of patient care shall 
be brought unless filed within one year from the date of the alleged act, 
omission, or neglect, or within one year from the date of discovery of 
the alleged act, omission, or neglect; however, even as to claims filed 
within one year from the date of such discovery, in all events such 
claims shall be filed at the latest within a period of three years from the 
date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect. 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5628(A) (2007). The three year “outside limit” is a 
codification of the “discovery doctrine,” known in Louisiana and civil law 
jurisdictions as contra non valentem, short for contra non valentem agere nulla 
currit praescriptio, which means “prescription does not run against a party 
unable to act.” Hebert v. Doctors Mem’l Hosp., 486 So. 2d 717, 721 n.7 (La. 
1986). Despite the text of Louisiana Civil Code article 3467, “[p]rescription runs 
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claims shall be filed at the latest within a period of three years 
from the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect.”19 The filing 
of a request for an MRP review of a claim suspends the time 
within which a suit must be instituted until 90 days after the 
plaintiff (or her attorney) receives notification of the issuance of 
the MRP’s opinion.20 
From the inception of the Medical Malpractice Act, courts and 
commentators debated whether the periods during which a claim 
arising from medical malpractice must be filed were prescriptive or 
peremptive.21 Eventually, the Louisiana Supreme Court held in 
Hebert v. Doctors Memorial Hospital that both the one-year and 
three-year periods were prescriptive in nature.22 The differences 
between the effects of prescription and peremption in medical 
malpractice suits, important in Hebert, were minimized by the 
holdings of Borel and Warren, which attributed one of the major 
effects of peremption to the Medical Malpractice Act—the 
holdings barred interruption of prescription.23  
                                                                                                             
 
against all persons unless exception is established by legislation[,]” Louisiana 
courts apply the doctrine to suspend prescription where a person is unable to act. 
See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 3467 cmt. d (2011); Corsey v. State Department of 
Corrections, 375 So. 2d 1319 (La. 1979). 
 19. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5628(A) (2007). 
 20. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) (Supp. 2011). For purposes 
of brevity, the time at which notification of the issuance of the MRP’s opinion is 
received by the plaintiff or his attorney will be referred to throughout this 
Comment as “after the MRP opinion,” or by other similar language. 
 21. Hackenberg, supra note 13, at 819; see, e.g., Borel v. Young, 989 So. 2d 
42, 64 (La. 2008) (on rehearing, finding the period is prescriptive); Borel, 989 
So. 2d at 51 (on original hearing) (“[W]e find [section 9:5628] establishes a 
peremptive time period.”); Hebert, 486 So. 2d at 724 (“[W]e conclude that 
[Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:5628] is in both of its features . . . a 
prescription statute . . . .”); FRANK L. MARAIST & THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR., 
LOUISIANA TORT LAW 236 (1996) (“The statute contains both a one-year 
prescriptive period (including a codified discovery rule) and what seems to be a 
three-year peremptive period.”). 
 22. See Hebert, 486 So. 2d 717; see also Warren v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 
21 So. 3d 186, 205 (La. 2008) (expressing approval of the Hebert and Borel 
(rehearing) holdings that the periods are prescriptive). 
 23. This point was candidly expressed in a footnote in Warren, 21 So. 3d at 
205 n.3. By refusing to apply interruption of prescription or relation back of an 
amended petition, the court caused the prescriptive period to resemble a 
peremptive period, which cannot be interrupted and has been found to forbid 
relation back. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3461 (2007) (“Peremption may not 
be renounced, interrupted, or suspended.”); see also Naghi v. Brener, 17 So. 3d 
919, 925 (La. 2009) (plurality opinion written by Victory, J.) (forbidding 
relation back because of its interference with the operation of peremption and 
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B. Liberative Prescription and Peremption 
Louisiana Civil Code articles 3445 through 3472 delineate the 
differences between liberative prescription and peremption.24 
Liberative prescription bars actions because of a plaintiff’s inaction.25 
On the other hand, “[p]eremption is a period of time fixed by law for 
the existence of a right.” 26 Unless the right is exercised before the end 
of the peremptive period, it is extinguished.27 Although liberative 
prescription merely prevents enforcement of a right of action, 
peremption actually destroys the right.28  
While prescription can be interrupted or suspended, peremption 
may not.29 The interruption of prescription is the wellspring from 
which the decisions in LeBreton, Borel, and Warren flow. The 
Louisiana Supreme Court decided all of these cases on the basis 
that the claims had prescribed because interruption was not 
applicable in the area of medical malpractice.30 
C. Interruption and Suspension of Prescription 
When prescription is interrupted, the prescriptive “clock” starts 
over again after the interruption ends.31 For example, if a 
                                                                                                             
 
the peremptive destruction of the right of action). The Louisiana Supreme Court 
later limited Naghi to its facts in Scaglione v. Juneau, 40 So. 3d 127 (La. 2010). 
In his 2010 article for the Louisiana Bar Journal, Professor Crawford colorfully 
referred to the “doctored-up” prescriptive nature of such statutes as section 
9:5628: “Put lipstick on prescription and it is still prescription.” William E. 
Crawford, Peremption and Legal Malpractice: Does Civil Code Article 2315 
Create Rights Subject to Peremption?, 58 LA. B. J. 24, 25 n.5. 
 24. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 3445–72 (2007). While there are a number of 
differences, only those relevant to the issues discussed in this comment are set 
forth here. 
 25. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3447 (2007). 
 26. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3458 (2007). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. cmt. b (citing Pounds v. Schori, 377 So. 2d 1195, 1198 (La. 1979)). 
 29. Liberative prescription can be interrupted by filing suit or service of 
process, LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3462 (2007), or by acknowledgment, LA. CIV. 
CODE ANN. art. 3464 (2007). Prescription can be suspended by statute. See, e.g., 
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3469 (2007). Louisiana courts have also recognized the 
jurisprudential doctrine of contra non valentem, which suspends prescription. 
Peremption is not subject to suspension or interruption. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 
3461 (2007). 
 30. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 31. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3466 (2007) (“If prescription is interrupted, the 
time that has run is not counted. Prescription commences to run anew from the 
last day of interruption.”). 
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prescriptive period of one year is interrupted on the 300th day, 
when the interruption terminates the prescriptive period remaining 
is 365 days. A common example of interruption occurs when a suit 
is filed in a court of competent jurisdiction and proper venue; it 
continues as long as the suit remains pending.32 The interruption of 
prescription is effective against all solidary obligors (and their 
successors) and in favor of “several parties [who] share a single 
cause of action.”33 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 40:1299.47 provides that 
the running of prescription against all joint and solidary obligors, 
and joint tortfeasors, is suspended by the filing of a request for a 
review of a medical malpractice claim with the division of 
administration.34 However, the effect of suspension of prescription 
differs from interruption in that the period of suspension is merely 
“not counted toward [the] accrual of prescription.”35  
When suspension of prescription ends, the clock does not start 
over; it begins to run again from where it paused.36 In contrast with 
the example of interruption above, if a prescriptive period of one 
year is suspended on the 300th day, when the suspension is over 
the prescriptive period remaining is 65 days. 
Liberative prescription, a product of Roman law, is grounded 
in the belief that it contributes to the stability of society by putting 
an end to litigation and reducing the uncertainty of the debtor.37 
                                                                                                             
 32. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 3462 and 3463 (2007). 
 33. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1799 (2008) (interruption against one solidary 
obligor is effective against the other solidary obligors); Williams v. Sewerage & 
Water Bd. of New Orleans, 611 So. 2d 1383, 1390 (La. 1993) (where because a 
widow’s suit for compensation benefits interrupted prescription, and she shared 
a cause of action (wrongful death) with her children, the children were entitled 
to interruption of prescription). In the context of interruption of prescription, a 
cause of action is the “juridical facts which constitute the basis of the right.” 
Benoit v. Allstate Ins. Co., 773 So. 2d 702, 706 (La. 2000); see also Louviere v. 
Shell Oil Co., 440 So. 2d 93, 95 (La. 1983). 
 34. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) (Supp. 2011). The 
suspension of prescription provided for in section 40:1299.47 continues until 90 
days after notification to the claimant or his attorney of the MRP’s opinion, id. 
at (A)(2)(a), the claim is dismissed in accordance with the section, id. at 
(A)(2)(c), or the panel is dissolved in accordance with the section, id. at (B)(3).  
 35. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3472 (2007). 
 36. See id. 
 37. Patrick D. Gallaugher, Jr., Comment, Revision of the Civil Code 
Provisions on Liberative Prescription, 60 TUL. L. REV. 379, 380 (1985). 
“Without [prescription] there would be no security in transactions, no stability in 
private estates, no peace among individuals, no order in the state.” 5 G. Baudry-
Lacantinerie & Albert Tissier, Traité Théorique Et Pratique De Droit Civil, 
Prescription, in CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS 18, No. 29 (La. St. Law Inst. trans., 
1972) (4th ed. 1924). Specifically, liberative prescription is based on a 
presumption of payment. Id. at 21, No. 32. Liberative prescription was meant to 
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The purpose of interruption of prescription is “to fix the rights of 
the parties at the time prescription is interrupted . . . .”38 The 
purpose of suspension of prescription is to provide “a measure of 
equity” to a plaintiff who is prevented by law or circumstances 
from interrupting prescription.39 This effect ensures that everyone 
has the same prescriptive period during which they can assert their 
rights.40 
Despite the public policy benefits of prescription, when a party 
amends his pleadings and does not enjoy the benefits of 
interruption or suspension of prescription, the “preference [of the 
law] for resolving disputes on their merits” will sometimes allow 
the “relation back” of the amendments.41 
D. Relation Back of Amended Pleadings 
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1153 controls the 
relation back of amended pleadings.42 Relation back allows the 
assertion of claims or defenses in an amended pleading that 
otherwise would have prescribed.43 Generally, if a pleading is 
amended after the prescriptive period has run, it will relate back to 
the timely filing of the original pleading if “the action or defense 
asserted [by the amendment] arises out of the conduct, transaction, 
                                                                                                             
 
protect a debtor from having to pay a debt twice due to loss of the evidence of 
payment; “prescription will substitute for the missing document.” Id. at 17, No. 
27. “[A defendant] ought not to be called on to resist a claim when ‘evidence has 
been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.’” 
Developments in the Law—Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185 
(1950) (quoting Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 
U.S. 342, 349 (1944)). 
 38. In re Noe, 958 So. 2d 617, 632 (La. 2007). Once an obligor has 
acknowledged his debt or been sued (either of which interrupt prescription, see 
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 3463 & 3464 (2007)), there is no reason to think he 
will be “uncertain” with respect to his obligation, and such acknowledgment or 
suit provides the obligor with adequate notice to preserve any proofs he might 
have with respect to payment. 
 39. See, e.g., Corsey v. State Dept. of Corrections, 375 So. 2d 1319, 1321 
(La. 1979) (recognizing the doctrine of contra non valentem); 1 MARCEL 
PLANIOL, TRAITÉ ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL Part 2, at 594, No. 2698 (La. St. 
Law Inst. trans., 1959) (12th ed. 1939). 
 40. PLANIOL, supra note 39 at 594, No. 2698. 
 41. See Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A., 130 S.Ct. 2485, 2494 (2010). 
 42. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1153 (2005). 
 43. See, e.g., Ray v. Alexandria Mall, 434 So. 2d 1083, 1086 (La. 1983) 
(relation back removes the grounds for the peremptory exception of 
prescription); Naghi v. Brener, 17 So. 3d 919, 925 (La. 2009) (relation back 
avoids the operation of prescription). 
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or occurrence set forth . . . in the original pleading.”44 The 
Louisiana Supreme Court interpreted the broad language of article 
1153 in Ray v. Alexandria Mall and Giroir v. South Louisiana 
Medical Center and established criteria for adding or substituting 
defendants and plaintiffs.45 The court recognized that article 1153 
was modeled after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), and that 
its “doctrinal commentaries and judicial interpretations are 
strongly persuasive as to the meaning and application of the 
Louisiana article.”46 The United States Supreme Court recently 
found that the purpose of relation back is “to balance the interests 
of the defendant protected by the statute of limitations with the 
preference expressed in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 
general, and Rule 15 in particular, for resolving disputes on their 
merits.”47  
The general rules of prescription and relation back, while 
acting to balance the interests of the public, defendants, and 
plaintiffs, seem somewhat academic in light of recent Louisiana 
medical malpractice jurisprudence. In the line of cases beginning 
                                                                                                             
 44. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1153 (2005). 
 45. Both cases created criteria founded on a balance between the preference 
for having suits decided on the basis of their merits as opposed to technical 
mistakes, and a desire to refrain from prejudicing the defense. Ray, 434 So. 2d at 
1086–87 (establishing criteria for adding defendants); Giroir v. South La. Med. 
Ctr., 475 So. 2d 1040, 1044 (La. 1985) (establishing criteria for adding 
plaintiffs). It is worthwhile to note in passing that the facts of Giroir sounded in 
medical malpractice, with the plaintiffs making wrongful death and survival 
claims. 
Under the circumstances of this case, no essential protective purpose of 
the prescriptive statute is violated by permitting relation back of the 
post prescription amendment based on the same factual situation 
pleaded in the original timely petition. . . . The fundamental purpose of 
prescription statutes is only to afford a defendant economic and 
psychological security if no claim is made timely, and to protect him 
from stale claims and from the loss of non-preservation of relevant 
proof. 
Girior, 475 So. 2d at 1045. Although the claims were rooted in medical 
malpractice, analysis of the prescriptive statutes in the case was not considered 
from within the context of Louisiana Revised Statutes sections 9:5628 and 
40:1299.47. Therefore, the Court may have neglected to consider the 
prescriptive policy concerns which many courts and commentators have 
attributed to the statutes—namely that of reducing the cost of health care and 
medical malpractice insurance by limiting the period in which claims may be 
filed, and through the institution of an MRP “filter” for claims. See, e.g., Webb, 
supra note 5, at 666; Firestone, supra note 15, at 1553 n.40. This policy concern 
is discussed infra Part II.B.3. 
 46. Giroir, 475 So. 2d at 1042 (citing Ray, 434 So. 2d at 1083). 
 47. Krupski v. Costa Cociere S.p.A.,130 S.Ct. 2485, 2494 (2010). The 
Court also held that relation back under Rule 15 does not depend on the 
amending party’s timeliness in seeking to amend the pleading. Id. at 2490. 
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with LeBreton v. Rabito, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that 
the general rules of interruption of prescription (including relation 
back) do not apply in the area of medical malpractice.48 
II. ANALYSIS 
This Part shows how the Louisiana Supreme Court’s broad 
application of the LeBreton rule, which was intended to be limited 
in its application, creates unjust results. Unfortunately for those 
with certain wrongful death and survival claims, the court’s refusal 
to apply interruption of prescription and relation back in medical 
malpractice actions means they may be unable to enforce their 
rights. 
A. An Ounce of Prescription Is Worth a Pound of Cure—LeBreton 
Should Be Limited to its Facts 
In LeBreton, the court held the general codal rules of 
interruption did not apply in an action arising in medical 
malpractice when suit had been filed before receipt of the MRP’s 
opinion.49 The court explained that the general codal rules of 
interruption of prescription conflicted with suspension provided in 
the Medical Malpractice Act.50 The Borel court declined to limit 
LeBreton to its facts, extending it to a situation where suit was 
properly filed after receipt of the MRP’s opinion.51 
1. Only a Premature Suit Creates a Conflict 
Diana LeBreton filed a wrongful death claim in district court 
against three doctors on August 18, 1992 (for their actions on 
August 18, 1991, alleged to have caused her father’s death).52 On 
August 19, 1992, she filed a request for review of her claim by an 
MRP.53 The doctors filed dilatory exceptions of prematurity, which 
were granted by the district court in July and August of 1993.54 
                                                                                                             
 48. Warren v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 21 So. 3d 186, 206–08 (2009). 
 49. LeBreton v. Rabito, 714 So. 2d 1226, 1230–31 (La. 1998). 
 50. Id. at 1227.  
 51. See Borel v. Young, 989 So. 2d 42, 67 (La. 2008). 
 52. LeBreton, 714 So. 2d at 1227. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. The basis of the dilatory exception of prematurity was that the suit 
was filed before notice of the MRP opinion was sent to the plaintiff. See id. at 
1229–30. As a result, the suit was dismissed without prejudice. Id. The dilatory 
exception “retards the progress of the action,” but does not generally defeat it. 
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 923 (2005). The effect of sustaining a dilatory 
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The MRP sent its finding of no medical malpractice to the 
plaintiff’s attorneys on August 14, 1996.55 Then, on February 3, 
1997, the plaintiff again filed suit for wrongful death against the 
doctors.56 
The trial court used the reasoning supplied in Hernandez v. 
Lafayette Bone & Joint Clinic57 to support a decision overruling 
the defendants’ peremptory exceptions of prescription.58 
Hernandez contained facts similar to LeBreton.  
In Hernandez, the alleged malpractice began on January 4, 
1980, and remained undiscovered until March 16, 1981.59 The 
plaintiff filed a medical malpractice lawsuit in district court on 
March 15, 1982, and requested an MRP on March 22, 1982.60 A 
few months later, sustaining the defendants’ dilatory exceptions of 
prematurity, the court dismissed the suit without prejudice, as 
required by Louisiana Revised Statutes section 40:1299.47.61 The 
MRP notified the plaintiff of its opinion on August 12, 1983.62 The 
plaintiff then filed a second suit against all defendants on 
December 16, 1983, which the trial court deemed prescribed.63 
It was undisputed that the first suit was filed timely.64 The 
Third Circuit Court of Appeal applied Louisiana Civil Code article 
3463 and its comment (b), finding that prescription had been 
interrupted continuously by the first suit and began to run anew 
upon the suit’s dismissal, “unless something had happened in the 
meanwhile to again prevent the running of prescription.”65 But, the 
                                                                                                             
 
exception of prematurity is dismissal without prejudice. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. 
ANN. art. 933 (2005); see also id. cmt. c. 
 55. Id. at 1227. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Hernandez v. Lafayette Bone & Joint Clinic, 467 So. 2d 113 (La. Ct. 
App. 3d 1985). 
 58. LeBreton, 714 So. 2d at 1227. 
 59. Hernandez, 467 So. 2d at 114. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 114–15. Article 3463 provides: 
An interruption of prescription resulting from the filing of a suit in a 
competent court and in the proper venue or from service of process 
within the prescriptive period continues as long as the suit is pending. 
Interruption is considered never to have occurred if the plaintiff 
abandons, voluntarily dismisses the action at any time either before the 
defendant has made any appearance of record or thereafter, or fails to 
prosecute the suit at the trial. 
2012] COMMENT 497 
 
 
 
court reasoned that something did happen to prevent the running of 
prescription—suspension of prescription triggered by the request 
for the MRP review.66 
By this method, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal applied 
suspension and interruption of prescription simultaneously.67 This 
allowed a plaintiff who filed a premature medical malpractice suit 
to gain an additional year of prescription to file his suit anew, in 
addition to the suspension provided by the Medical Malpractice 
Act.68 
In LeBreton, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that a patient 
must request and receive the opinion of an MRP before an action is 
commenced in a court of law.69 Recognizing that section 
40:1299.47 provides for the suspension of prescription during the 
MRP’s review of the claim,70 the court found that “the legislature 
by special provision for the inclusion of suspension excluded the 
applicability of interruption of prescription.”71 Justice Knoll wrote 
for the majority: “[C]onsidering the doctrinal underpinnings for the 
existence of the rules of suspension, it is evident that there is no 
need for the general rules of interruption of prescription to 
combine with suspension to synergistically benefit the plaintiff.”72 
The court further explained that its ruling served the judicial 
system by eliminating the advantage afforded to plaintiffs who fail 
to follow the proper medical malpractice litigation procedure.73 It 
reversed the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal’s decision denying the 
doctors’ peremptory exception of prescription.74 
Based on the structure and language of the opinion, the court’s 
disapproval of an advantage given to prematurely filing plaintiffs 
                                                                                                             
 
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3463 (2007). “[I]f an interruption results and the action 
is dismissed without prejudice, the period during which the action was pending 
does not count toward the accrual of prescription. The plaintiff then has the full 
prescriptive period within which to bring a new action.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. 
art. 3463 cmt. b (2007). 
 66. Hernandez, 467 So. 2d at 115. 
 67. See LeBreton v. Rabito, 714 So. 2d 1226, 1229 n.6 (La. 1998) 
(“Plaintiff has conceded that she can only defeat defendants’ peremptory 
exception of prescription if she can simultaneously take advantage of 
interruption and suspension of prescription.”). 
 68. Id. at 1230. 
 69. Id. (citing Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256 (La. 1978)). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 1231. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
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was only a secondary reason for its holding in LeBreton.75 The 
primary reason was a perceived conflict between Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 40:1299.47 and the general codal rules of 
prescription.76 
The court held that section 40:1299.47 only suspends the time 
within which a suit must be instituted when a request for review by 
an MRP is made.77 The court reasoned that if Louisiana Civil Code 
articles 3466 and 3472 applied, then the suspension and 
prescription provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act would “be 
written out.”78 
The LeBreton court recognized that a request for review by an 
MRP and receipt of an opinion must be made and obtained before 
a claimant can properly file in a court of law.79 Upon timely 
request for review by an MRP, Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
40:1299.47 provides that prescription is suspended during the 
                                                                                                             
 75. The structure and language of the opinion point to the application of the 
rules of statutory construction as the primary basis for the holding and the 
dislike of unfair advantage to prematurely filing plaintiffs as secondary. An 
example of the language indicative of this assertion is, “[w]e further find that 
our ruling also serves the judicial system by eliminating an advantage which 
Hernandez granted to those litigants who failed to follow the proper procedural 
sequence in medical malpractice litigation.” LeBreton, 714 So. 2d at 1231. 
Assuming the truth of the previous assertion, it remains that a substantial 
proportion of the opinion was devoted to the development of the reasoning 
behind the secondary argument. 
 76. LeBreton, 714 So. 2d at 1229. 
 77. Id. at 1229–30. 
 78. Id. at 1230. Justice Knoll took the time to comment in a footnote, “[a]s 
regards the non-qualified health care provider and cases not involving medical 
malpractice, [Louisiana Civil Code article 3462], the general provision, provides 
for interruption of prescription.” Id. at 1231 n.7. This dictum is partially belied 
by Justice Knoll’s own reasoning. In cases of medical malpractice: 
[t]he filing of a request for a review of a claim shall suspend the 
running of prescription against all joint and solidary obligors, and all 
joint tortfeasors, including but not limited to health care providers, both 
qualified and not qualified, to the same extent that prescription is 
suspended against the party or parties that are the subject of the request 
for review. 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) (2008) (emphasis added). If 
application of the general rules of prescription conflicts with the statute when 
applied to the qualified class of defendants, it should also conflict when applied 
to the other. The footnote’s assertion is only supported if the reason a conflict 
exists is the necessity of the MRP review of medical malpractice claims against 
the qualified health care provider. The lack of necessity of review for the non-
qualified tortfeasor means suspension of prescription is not necessary, allowing 
the inference that interruption of prescription against them is appropriate. Justice 
Knoll’s dictum was implicitly followed in Coleman v. Acromed Corp., 764 So. 
2d 81 (La. Ct. App. 1999). 
 79. LeBreton, 714 So. 2d at 1230–31. 
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panel’s review and until 90 days following the plaintiff’s (or his 
attorney’s) receipt of notification of the panel’s opinion.80 
Allowing interruption of prescription by a premature suit before 
and during the panel’s review would render the suspension of 
prescription provided by section 40:1299.47 ineffective, or at least 
subvert the purpose behind the Act by providing additional time to 
file.81  
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 40:1299.47 contains a 
provision that was discussed only briefly in the LeBreton majority 
opinion, where the court stated that “[n]o action against a health 
care provider covered by this Part, or his insurer, may be 
commenced in any court before the claimant’s proposed complaint 
has been presented to a medical review panel established pursuant 
to this Section.”82 The statute forbids the suspension or interruption 
of prescription by filing a request for review with any “entity” 
other than the division of administration.83 This provides a ready 
means for harmonizing the general rules of prescription with the 
Medical Malpractice Act. It is precisely the means favored by the 
LeBreton majority: a suit to enforce rights arising from medical 
malpractice in district court, filed before receipt of notification of 
an MRP’s opinion, does not interrupt prescription.84  
The proper way to begin asserting a medical malpractice claim 
is by a request for an MRP review with the division of 
administration, for which the plaintiff is provided with the 
“measure of equity” of suspension of prescription.85 It makes no 
                                                                                                             
 80. Id. at 1230. 
 81. See id. This is an instance where Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
9:5628 is considered as part of the Medical Malpractice Act.  
Dissenting in LeBreton, Chief Justice Calogero wrote that the provisions of 
the statutes in question were not in conflict, “as both provisions can easily be 
harmonized with the result of each provision being given full effect.” LeBreton, 
714 So. 2d at 1232 (Calogero, C.J., dissenting). Noting that section 40:1299.47 
provides only a suspensive period, that article 3462 provides only for 
interruption of prescription, and neither contain ambiguous language about 
suspension or interruption of prescription, he opined that Louisiana Civil Code 
article 9 forbade further interpretation in search of the intent of the legislature. 
Chief Justice Calogero essentially favored the Hernandez interpretation of the 
statutes, which he wrote “clearly harmonizes the two provision[s] at issue[.]” Id. 
at 1233. He asserted that such a result was “mandated by the long-standing 
jurisprudential rule [that w]here there are two permissible interpretations of a 
prescriptive statute, the courts must adopt the one that favors maintaining rather 
than barring the action.” Id. (citing Foster v. Breaux, 270 So. 2d 526 (La. 
1972)). 
 82. Id. at 1230; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(B)(1)(a)(i) (2008). 
 83. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) (2008). 
 84. See LeBreton, 714 So. 2d at 1230–31. 
 85. Id. at 1230. 
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sense to provide the plaintiff with a more effective “remedy” 
(interruption of prescription) when he has not properly begun to 
assert his claim than the “remedy” provided (suspension) when a 
claimant has proceeded according to the dictates of the statute.86  
2. LeBreton Broadened: A New Prescription for Medical 
Malpractice 
In the Borel case, the plaintiffs timely requested an MRP 
review of their malpractice claim against a medical center and two 
doctors.87 After receipt of the MRP’s opinion, the plaintiffs timely 
filed suit against only the medical center.88 Later, plaintiffs filed 
similar claims in a separate lawsuit against the doctors, alleging 
solidary liability with the medical center.89 The doctors argued the 
claims against them had prescribed.90 In response, the plaintiffs 
argued that their suit against the medical center had interrupted 
prescription against the doctors.91 
The Borel plurality relied primarily on LeBreton’s holding that, 
“considering the doctrinal underpinnings for the existence of the 
rules of suspension, it is evident that there is no need for the 
general rules of interruption of prescription to combine with 
suspension to synergistically benefit the plaintiff.”92 However, 
there is no such synergy when the plaintiff files suit after receiving 
notice of the MRP’s opinion, as in Borel.93 
A narrow view of LeBreton would bar interruption only on suits 
filed before receipt of the MRP opinion.94 Nothing in LeBreton 
indicates that the general codal rules of prescription conflict with 
provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act after receipt of the MRP 
opinion. The broadest statement in LeBreton is: “[w]e . . . find[] that 
the specific statutory provision providing for the suspension of 
prescription in the context of medical malpractice should have been 
applied alone, not complementary to the more general codal article 
                                                                                                             
 86. The proper “remedy,” of course, being suspension of prescription. See 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) (2008). 
 87. Borel v. Young, 989 So. 2d 42, 45 (La. 2008). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. The lawsuits were eventually consolidated. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 67 (on rehearing) (quoting LeBreton v. Rabito, 714 So. 2d 1226, 
1231 (La. 1998)). 
 93. Id. at 45 (on original hearing). 
 94. The narrow interpretation of LeBreton was expressed succinctly as “a 
medical malpractice suit, filed prior to the request for a medical review panel, 
does not interrupt prescription on a medical malpractice claim.” Farve v. Jarrott, 
886 So. 2d 594, 596 (La. App. Ct. 2004). 
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which addresses interruption of prescription.”95 This finding 
expressly envisions the complementary application of suspension 
and interruption of prescription; however, in the time period 
following notification of the MRP’s opinion, the claimant does not 
have the advantage of both suspension and interruption. After the 
notification, upon filing suit, the plaintiff enjoys interruption only. 
For example, if a plaintiff filed suit on the day after he received 
notification of the medical board’s opinion, he would theoretically 
enjoy 89 more days of suspension of prescription—but to what 
effect? After filing suit, prescription is continuously interrupted.96 
The greater effect has subsumed the lesser with no complementary 
or synergistic effect. The 89 days will expire and prescription will 
remain under continuous interruption because of the pending 
lawsuit.97  
The Borel opinion acknowledged factual differences from 
LeBreton but declared, without further analysis (except for citing 
facts and analysis from Richard v. Tenet Health Systems, Inc.98): 
[O]ur holding in LeBreton clearly stands for the principle 
that medical malpractice claims are governed by the 
specific provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act 
regarding suspension of prescription, to the exclusion of the 
general codal articles on interruption of prescription. That 
holding is broad enough to extend to the instant case.99 
                                                                                                             
 95. LeBreton, 714 So. 2d at 1226. 
 96. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3463 (2007). 
 97. See id. It must be stated, though, that should the suit be dismissed 
without prejudice for any reason before the expiration of the 90 day period of 
suspension, interruption of prescription should be ineffective, for the same 
reasons it was in LeBreton. See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
 98. Richard v. Tenet Health Systems, Inc., 871 So. 2d 671 (La. Ct. App. 
2004). The Richard opinion briefly cited LeBreton in a footnote for the 
proposition that the general rules of prescription do not apply in cases governed 
by the Medical Malpractice Act. Richard, 871 So. 2d at 673, n.1. Richard 
presented virtually no analysis on the subject other than its citation to LeBreton. 
Furthermore, the facts of Richard are readily distinguishable from those of 
Borel. In Richard, an MRP considered complaints against one group of 
defendants, but not a second group. Richard, 871 So. 2d at 672–73. The plaintiff 
timely filed suit against the defendants the MRP had considered, and later 
requested an MRP to consider claims against the second group. Id. The court 
held that the suit against the first group did not interrupt prescription against the 
second group, against whom the request for an MRP was untimely made. Id. at 
674. Essentially, the suit was premature with respect to the second group of 
defendants, putting the Richard facts within the scope of a narrow view of the 
LeBreton holding; therefore, even a broadened view of the LeBreton holding in 
Richard was not necessary to the decision and was obiter dictum. 
 99. Borel, 989 So. 2d at 67. 
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Justice Weimer did not explain why the holding was broad 
enough to extend to the facts of Borel. Perhaps the court should 
have provided reasons why the narrower view was impermissible, 
given the jurisprudential rule favoring maintaining an action in the 
face of a prescriptive statute with two permissible 
interpretations.100 Because prescriptive periods are founded on 
public policy and in derogation of individuals’ rights, they are 
stricti juris and “must come clearly under specific provisions of the 
law.”101 Although the plurality did not extend prescription where 
none existed under the statute, it refused to apply interruption of 
prescription where the statute was silent about it. Thus, the above 
rule applies by analogy. 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeal had similarly adhered to a 
broad interpretation of the LeBreton holding in its hearing of 
Borel.102 The court quoted language from LeBreton, omitting 
words indicating that the holding might be restricted to the facts of 
the case: 
 [B]y virtue of the legislative enactment calling for the 
necessity of a medical review panel prior to submission of 
the case to the district court, the legislature by special 
provision for the inclusion of suspension excluded the 
applicability of interruption of prescription. . . . 
                                                                                                             
 100. Foster v. Breaux, 270 So. 2d 526, 529 (La. 1972). It should be noted 
that a commentator criticized the rule as “dangerous because judges are resistant 
to changes in the law and tend to use [the] canon to preserve old laws at the 
expense of new ones, thus undermining legislative supremacy.” Nadia N. San 
Miguel, Note, Taylor v. Giddens: Louisiana Supreme Court Tailors Medical 
Malpractice Statute, 39 LOY. L. REV. 699, 704–05 (1993–94). “As stated in 
former article 20 of the [Louisiana] Civil Code, ‘[t]he distinction of laws into 
odious laws and laws entitled to favor, with a view of narrowing or extending 
their construction, can not [sic] be made by those whose duty it is to interpret 
them.’” Id. at 705 (explaining that while former article 20 is no longer in effect, 
it is still authoritative as a corollary to legislative supremacy). Here, where the 
language of the statute itself was seen as clear and unambiguous (at least by 
Chief Justice Calogero, see LeBreton, 714 So. 2d at 1232 (Calogero, C.J., 
dissenting)), application of the rule in question, far from “narrowing or 
extending [its] construction,” would merely preserve the statute as written, 
which contains no references to the barring of interruption of prescription 
except: “Filing a request for review of a malpractice claim as required by this 
Section with any agency or entity other than the division of administration shall 
not suspend or interrupt the running of prescription.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) (2008). 
 101. Meyer v. Parish of Plaquemines, 11 So. 2d 291, 296 (La. 1942) 
(refusing to extend prescription by analogy). 
 102. Borel v. Young, 947 So. 2d 824, 829 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2006), aff’d, 
989 So. 2d 42 (La. 2007). 
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 Thus, considering the doctrinal underpinnings for the 
existence of the rules of suspension, it is evident that there 
is no need for the general rules of interruption of 
prescription to combine with suspension to synergistically 
benefit the plaintiff.103 
However, the passage from LeBreton actually begins: “In the 
present case, by virtue of the legislative enactment . . .”104 The 
Third Circuit Court of Appeal provided no additional analysis or 
reasons why it thought the holding should be interpreted broadly. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court’s Borel plurality opinion cited 
Richard v. Tenet Health Systems, Inc. for support of the broad view 
of LeBreton.105 Richard cited “LeBreton and the cases following 
it” (neglecting to cite any specific cases) to support the broad 
view.106 But, an extensive review of the cases following LeBreton 
and preceding Borel (both the Third Circuit Court of Appeal and 
Louisiana Supreme Court decisions) revealed no cases giving 
reasons for a broad interpretation of the LeBreton holding.107 Only 
three cases appeared to follow such an interpretation: Yen v. 
Avoyelles Parish Police Jury,108 Borel (Third Circuit Court of 
Appeal opinion), and Borel (Louisiana Supreme Court opinion). 
Yen was decided after Borel (Third Circuit) and was not cited in 
Borel (Louisiana Supreme Court).109 
                                                                                                             
 103. Id. at 829–30. 
 104. LeBreton v. Rabito, 714 So. 2d 1226, 1230 (La. 1998) (emphasis 
added). 
 105. Borel v. Young, 989 So. 2d 42, 67–68 (La. 2008); Richard v. Tenet 
Health Systems Inc., 871 So. 2d 671 (La. Ct. App. 2004). 
 106. Richard, 871 So. 2d at 673, n.1. 
 107. One case of note arose: Yen v. Avoyelles Parish Police Jury, 971 So. 2d 
536, 539 (La. Ct. App. 2007), which cites the Third Circuit Court of Appeal’s 
hearing of Borel for the broadened LeBreton holding but provides no additional 
analysis or reasons. Other cases either referred to the LeBreton holding in the 
narrow sense, or in the broad sense but had facts similar to LeBreton, where the 
plaintiff had filed prematurely in a court of law and either never requested an 
MRP review or did so after filing in court. See, e.g., LaCoste v. Pendleton 
Methodist Hosp., L.L.C., 947 So. 2d 150 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (referring to the 
LeBreton holding in the narrow sense); Metro. Dev. Ctr. v. Liner, 891 So. 2d 62 
(La. Ct. App. 2004) (referring broadly to the holding but with roughly the same 
pertinent facts as LeBreton). Borel (Third Circuit Court of Appeal and Supreme 
Court), Yen, and Warren appear to be the only cases which assert the broad 
interpretation of the LeBreton holding and have facts that make the holding 
necessary to reach the desired result; none explained reasons for the expansion 
of LeBreton. 
 108. 971 So. 2d 536 (La. Ct. App. 2007); see also supra note 107. 
 109. Borel (Third Circuit) was decided December 29, 2006 and Yen was 
decided December 5, 2007. 
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Concurring in the result of Warren, Justice Knoll discussed 
with seeming displeasure the broadening of the LeBreton holding, 
which she herself had authored: “The holding in LeBreton did not 
exclude the application of the general provisions on interruption of 
prescription in medical malpractice cases in other instances, just to 
the situation where the plaintiff sought to benefit by the 
simultaneous application of the interruption and suspension 
provisions.”110 
When a suit is filed timely, after notification of an MRP’s 
opinion, there is no conflict between the general rules of 
interruption of prescription and Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
40.1299.47. It is the simultaneous and complementary application 
of suspension and interruption of prescription that creates the 
conflict recognized in LeBreton. Lacking such a conflict, 
interruption of prescription is presumably permissible. The Borel 
plurality opinion provided no reasons or persuasive authority to 
support its broad interpretation of LeBreton. Given the rule 
favoring maintenance of actions when two permissible 
interpretations of prescriptive statutes exist, the adoption of the 
broad view of the LeBreton holding is questionable.111 Borel gave 
Louisiana medical malpractice defendants a new prescription: an 
uninterruptible period designed to cure the ill of rising medical 
costs. 
B. “Take two aspirin and call me in the morning”—the Louisiana 
Supreme Court Takes LeBreton Two Steps Further 
Borel put a stop to interruption of prescription against solidary 
tortfeasors—suit filed against one tortfeasor will not interrupt 
prescription against another solidarily liable tortfeasor, such as an 
employer.112 Warren went two steps further: it disallowed 
interruption in favor of plaintiffs who share the same cause of 
action and prevented relation back of amended pleadings.113 These 
are hard pills to swallow for some wrongful death and survival 
claimants. 
                                                                                                             
 110. Warren v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 21 So. 3d 186, 218 (La. 2009) (Knoll, 
J., concurring in result). 
 111. “Under Louisiana jurisprudence, prescriptive statutes are strictly 
construed, and of two permissible constructions that is adopted which favors 
maintaining rather than barring the action.” Foster v. Breaux, 270 So. 2d 526, 
529 (La. 1972). 
 112. See Borel v. Young, 989 So. 2d 42, 45, 67 (La. 2008). 
 113. Warren, So. 3d 186, 206–08 (La. 2009) (on rehearing). 
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1. Interruption of Prescription in Warren Would Not Have 
Created a Conflict 
On October 13, 2000, Terry Warren passed away while under 
the care of “various health care providers.”114 After receiving the 
required MRP opinion, Pamela and Theresa Warren, Terry’s 
widow and daughter, timely filed suit against the defendants on 
November 25, 2002. Sarah Warren, Terry’s other daughter, was 
aware of the suit but chose not to join as a plaintiff.115 On July 6, 
2004, the plaintiffs amended their petition, adding Sarah as a 
plaintiff with survival and wrongful death claims.116 The 
defendants filed a peremptory exception of prescription with 
respect to Sarah’s claims, arguing that her claims had 
prescribed.117 The defendants further argued that relation back was 
not proper because Sarah chose not to participate until she realized 
she might be called as a witness, and that the defendants would be 
prejudiced if a new plaintiff were added nearly three years after the 
request for an MRP’s opinion.118 
On original hearing the court cited Williams v. Sewerage & 
Water Board of New Orleans for the principle that when several 
parties share the same cause of action, interruption of prescription 
in favor of one is effective in favor of the other.119 Applying this 
principle, the court found that prescription with respect to Sarah 
Warren’s survival action was interrupted when her mother and 
sister filed suit.120  
Writing for the plurality on rehearing, Justice Victory first 
applied the broad interpretation of the LeBreton holding, citing 
Borel and distinguishing Williams: 
Williams was not a medical malpractice action. For had it 
been a medical malpractice action, Borel would dictate that 
the specific provisions of the Act apply to the exclusion of 
the general code articles on interruption of prescription 
against solidary obligors, just as the specific provisions of 
the Act regarding suspension of prescription applied to the 
                                                                                                             
 114. Id. at 203. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 188–89 (on original hearing). 
 120. Id. at 189 (on original hearing). The Court analyzed the prescription of 
the survival and wrongful death claims separately—the survival claim in an 
interruption of prescription framework and the wrongful death claim in a 
relation back framework. See id.  
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exclusion of the general code article on interruption of 
prescription against joint tortfeasors in Borel.121 
Finding its original decision contrary to Borel, and rejecting 
Williams’s application in the area of medical malpractice, the 
plurality found Sarah Warren’s survival claim had prescribed.122  
The Warren case is factually distinguishable from the LeBreton 
case. In LeBreton, the plaintiff filed her petition in court before 
requesting an MRP;123 but in Warren, the plaintiffs filed after 
receiving the opinion of an MRP.124 In short, the plaintiff’s suit 
was premature in LeBreton but not in Warren. It is true that 
Williams was not a medical malpractice case.125 However, the rules 
of interruption of prescription as applied therein create no conflict 
with the suspension of prescription provisions of the Medical 
Malpractice Act for the same reasons outlined above.126 Because 
there is no conflict, there is no reason to prevent the operation of 
the general rules of prescription in a medical malpractice lawsuit 
where suit is timely filed and not premature. 
Lacking such a conflict, there was no reason the court should 
have ignored the rule favoring the maintenance of actions in the 
face of ambiguous prescription statutes.127 At least, the plurality 
gave no reason—nor did it provide any reasons in support of the 
broad interpretation of LeBreton other than its references to 
Borel.128 Moreover, the plurality was not content to find only one 
claim prescribed. It continued to stretch LeBreton to hold that 
relation back is inapplicable in medical malpractice actions.129 
                                                                                                             
 121. Id. at 207 (on rehearing). 
 122. Id. 
 123. LeBreton v. Rabito, 714 So. 2d 1226, 1227 (La. 1998). 
 124. Warren, 21 So. 3d at 203. 
 125. Id. at 207–08. Williams v. Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans 
was a wrongful death and survival case alleging negligence outside the medical 
malpractice context. 611 So. 2d 1383, 1385–86 (La. 1993). 
 126. Cf. supra Part II.A.1–2. 
 127. Foster v. Breaux, 270 So. 2d 526, 529 (La. 1972). 
 128. Warren, 21 So. 3d at 206–07. Justice Knoll, concurring in result only 
with the Borel plurality opinion (on rehearing) wrote: 
In its criticism of the majority opinion on original hearing, the plurality 
opinion now cites to the principles of jurisprudence constante in its 
refusal to overrule the Hebert holding as to the three-year provision. 
However, jurisprudence constante does not give the Court license to 
perpetuate error as we are bound under our Constitution and the Civil 
Code to uphold and abide by the law. 
Borel v. Young, 989 So. 2d 42, 81 (La. 2008) (citing James L. Dennis, 
Interpretation and Application of the Civil Code and the Evaluation of Judicial 
Precedent, 54 LA. L. REV. 1, 10 (1993)).  
 129. See Warren, 21 So. 3d at 207. 
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2. Relation Back of Amended Petitions Creates No Conflict 
The Warren plurality viewed relation back of an amended 
petition as a way to “directly avoid[] the application of prescription 
by allowing a claim which would have otherwise prescribed to 
proceed.”130 Justice Victory perceived a conflict between relation 
back of the amended petition and the suspension provisions of the 
Medical Malpractice Act.131 However, if there is no conflict with 
respect to interruption of prescription and the Act, there should be 
no conflict with relation back if its purpose is to avoid the 
application of prescription.132 
Correct application of civil law principles leads to the 
conclusion that relation back should be allowed. The Civil Code 
contains the general rules of suspension and interruption of 
prescription.133 Louisiana Revised Statutes sections 9:5628 and 
40:1299.47 are special statutes acting as exceptions to the general 
rules found in the Civil Code.134 Under civilian methodology, if a 
general statute grants a right limited by a special statute, the special 
statute should be interpreted restrictively.135 This means the scope 
of the special statute providing the exception “may not be enlarged 
by analogy.”136 The Warren plurality’s reliance on an analogy 
between interruption of prescription and relation back violates this 
principle.137 
A restrictive interpretation of the LeBreton holding removes 
the specter of conflict between the Medical Malpractice Act and 
the general rules of prescription when suit is filed after the MRP 
opinion is received. It is therefore difficult to imagine a conflict 
between the Medical Malpractice Act and the relation back effect 
of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1153—after all, the 
Act is silent with respect to amended petitions and relation back.138 
Justice Weimer explained, concurring in the original hearing: 
                                                                                                             
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Cf. supra Part II.A. 
 133. See discussion supra Part I.B–C. 
 134. See Warren, 21 So. 3d at 205; discussion supra Part II.A. 
 135. Olivier Moréteau, An Introduction to Contamination, 3 J.C.L.S. 9, 13 
(2010). Here, the right granted is interruption of prescription under Louisiana 
Civil Code article 3462. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See Warren, 21 So. 3d at 207–08 (where the plurality applies its 
analogy between interruption of prescription and relation back). 
 138. Warren, 21 So. 3d at 197 (on original hearing, Weimer, J., concurring). 
The Act is also silent with respect to interruption of prescription, except for the 
following sentence: “Filing a request for review of a malpractice claim as 
required by this Section with any agency or entity other than the division of 
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[W]here there is no conflict between the general codal 
articles and the specific provisions of the Medical 
Malpractice Act, the various provisions should be read in 
conformity with each other. Thus, because the Medical 
Malpractice Act is silent as to the relation back of pleadings 
adding an additional claim and/or plaintiff, there is no bar 
to applying [Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article] 
1153 in this case.139 
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1153 “does not 
operate here simply to ‘get around medical malpractice 
prescription.’”140 Justice Weimer noted that the purpose of 
prescriptive statutes was to provide economic and psychological 
security and protect against stale claims and losses due to lack of 
preservation of proof.141 “Not one of those goals is undermined by 
[relation back,]” he wrote.142 Justice Weimer also reasoned that the 
Giroir factors ensured the defendants knew or should have known 
about the claims within the prescriptive period and were not 
prejudiced in their defense.143 
The plurality was concerned that “the application of [Louisiana 
Code of Civil Procedure article 1153] ‘would potentially subject a 
health care provider to an indefinite period of prescription, . . . a 
result clearly at odds with the purpose of the [Act].’”144 This is 
certainly a valid concern, but as Justice Weimer reasoned, the 
factors set forth in Ray v. Alexandria Mall and Giroir v. South 
Louisiana Medical Center protect this interest.145 This is especially 
                                                                                                             
 
administration shall not suspend or interrupt the running of prescription.” LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) (2008). 
 139. Warren, 21 So. 3d at 197 (on original hearing, Weimer, J., concurring). 
 140. Id. (apparently quoting Justice Victory’s dissenting opinion at 21 So. 3d 
at 198 (on original hearing)). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 207 (on rehearing, citing Borel v. Young, 989 So. 2d 42 (La. 
2008)). 
 145. Id. at 197 (on original hearing, Weimer, J., concurring); see Ray v. 
Alexandria Mall, 434 So. 2d 1083, 1086–87 (La. 1983) (adding claims against 
new defendants); Giroir v. S. La. Med. Ctr., Div. of Hosp, 475 So. 2d 1040, 
1044 (La. 1985) (adding claims by new plaintiffs). The factors were designed to 
ensure defendants had adequate notice of claims and were not prejudiced in their 
defense. The Giroir factors are: 
(1) [T]he amended claim arises out of the same conduct, transaction, or 
occurrence set forth in the original pleading; (2) the defendant either 
knew or should have known of the existence and involvement of the 
new plaintiff; (3) the new and the old plaintiffs are sufficiently related 
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true when considered in light of Warren’s facts—the suit was filed 
after receipt of the MRP’s opinion.146 The original majority and 
concurring opinions agreed that Sarah Warren’s wrongful death 
claim should relate back to the timely filing of the other plaintiffs’ 
petition.147 Chief Justice Calogero featured the four Giroir factors 
prominently in his analysis, finding all four factors satisfied.148 
The second Giroir factor is applied to ensure defendants have 
adequate notice of claims brought against them.149 The MRP 
review warns the qualified health care provider of such claims.150 
After all, the nature of the review is to determine whether the 
qualified health care provider met the applicable standard of 
care.151 Implicit in the review is the idea that the qualified provider 
is aware that a party is likely to assert a claim of medical 
malpractice against him. 
The value of this warning can be effectively expressed through 
an example. A medical malpractice claimant requests review of his 
claim by an MRP and then later timely files suit against both a 
non-qualified tortfeasor and a health care provider qualified under 
the Act.152 The qualified health care provider had earlier notice 
(through the medical review process) than the non-qualified 
tortfeasor. If the justification for relation back depends on the 
interest of defendants in having adequate notice of the claims 
against them, there is theoretically more reason to allow relation 
                                                                                                             
 
so that the added or substituted party is not wholly new or unrelated; 
(4) the defendant will not be prejudiced in preparing and conducting his 
defense. 
Giroir, 475 So. 2d at 1044. 
 146. Warren, 21 So. 3d at 203 (on rehearing). 
 147. Id. at 187, 194, 197. Chief Justice Calogero wrote for the majority on 
original hearing; Justices Kimball and Weimer concurred. 
 148. Id. at 189–94 (Calogero, C.J., on original hearing). Only the second and 
third factors are discussed here. 
 149. See id. at 192–93. 
 150. In addition, the panel’s review itself extends for an indefinite period. In 
Warren, the time between the request for review and receipt of the panel’s 
opinion was just under one year. 21 So. 3d at 187. In Borel v. Young, the time 
period was approximately one year and five months. 989 So. 2d 42, 45 (La. 
2008). In LeBreton v. Rabito, the time period was nearly four years. 714 So. 2d 
1226, 1227 (La. 1998). 
 151. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(G) (2008). 
 152. Under Borel, interruption of prescription occurs with respect to the non-
qualified tortfeasor but not the qualified health care provider. See Borel, 989 So. 
2d at 67; LeBreton,, 714 So. 2d at 1230, n.7.  
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back against the qualified health care provider than against the 
non-qualified tortfeasor.153  
On original hearing, the court found that the second factor was 
satisfied because the facts indicated the defendants had knowledge 
of the involvement of the new plaintiff at the time the original suit 
was filed.154 Similarly, when a qualified health care provider has 
knowledge of possible survival and wrongful death plaintiffs, 
relation back should be allowed. 
Sarah Warren, as a survival and wrongful death plaintiff, had a 
legal identity of interest with the original plaintiffs through 
operation of Louisiana Civil Code articles 2315.1 and 2315.2.155 
This point, which was not discussed by the court in the context of 
the third Giroir factor, is nonetheless important to the analysis of 
interruption of prescription. Requiring a close relationship and 
identity of interests with the original plaintiff ensures the purposes 
of the prescriptive statute with respect to defendants are not injured 
by allowing interruption of prescription in favor of the new 
plaintiff.156 On rehearing, Justice Victory reasoned that relation 
back operated as a way to avoid prescription.157 But, if the 
prerequisites for interruption of prescription are satisfied through 
notice and identity of interest, then prescription is not being 
avoided, but only “bridged” by notice and knowledge. Holding 
otherwise leads to the undesirable result that plaintiffs’ wrongful 
death and survival actions can prescribe before they ever accrue.158 
The analysis above shows that the interests of defendants are 
protected by application of the Giroir factors. However, the 
plurality opinion on rehearing found that relation back thwarted the 
                                                                                                             
 153. See Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 130 S.Ct. 2485, 2494 (2010) 
(“[T]he purpose of relation back[] [is] to balance the interests of the defendant 
protected by the statute of limitations with the preference expressed in . . . Rule 
15 . . . for resolving disputes on their merits.”); Ray v. Alexandria Mall,, 434 So. 
2d 1083, 1085 n.5 (La. 1983) (referring to “fair notice” as a reason for allowing 
relation back and listing “notice of the institution of the action that he will not be 
prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits” as a factor in whether to 
allow relation back against new defendants); Giroir v. S. La. Med. Ctr., Div. of 
Hosp., 475 So. 2d 1040, 1043 (La. 1985). 
 154. Warren, 21 So. 3d at 192 (on original hearing). 
 155. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2315.1 (Survival action) and 2315.2 
(Wrongful death action) (2010).  
 156. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Theriot, 376 So. 2d 950, 954 (La. 1979) (“None 
of these basic prescriptive values are offended when a subsequent claimant, 
closely connected in relationship and interest to the original plaintiff, enters the 
timely-filed suit to assert a claim based upon the same factual occurrence as that 
initially pleaded.”). 
 157. Warren, 21 So. 3d at 207. 
 158. See infra Part II.B.3. 
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special prescriptive purposes of the Act.159 A look at the purpose of 
the Medical Malpractice Act shows the error of this view. 
3. Interruption and Relation Back Do Not Offend the Purpose 
of the Statute 
The Medical Malpractice Act may differ in one respect from 
other prescriptive statutes—it was passed as a response to an 
urgent and specific need to stabilize medical costs.160 At the time 
of its passage there was great concern in many states about the 
rising cost of malpractice insurance.161 An open-ended prescriptive 
period (such as provided through an unlimited discovery doctrine) 
increased the cost of insurance premiums because the policies were 
traditionally written on an “occurrence” basis.162 The term 
“occurrence” is a bit ambiguous. It means “the commission of an 
act, error or omission or the date of discovery thereof or the date of 
injury caused thereby.”163 Open-ended discovery periods result in 
inaccurate rate setting because an occurrence under the policy 
might occur long after the year for which the rate was set.164 This 
uncertainty required insurance companies to keep larger reserves, 
leading to higher rates, which in turn lead to higher overall medical 
costs.165 Thus, the Act has a public purpose which may be stronger 
(or at least more specific) than that of other prescriptive statutes. 
This public purpose is not harmed by allowing relation back or 
interruption of prescription. In order for relation back or 
interruption of prescription to operate, a suit must first be timely 
filed. Allowing interruption of prescription or relation back with 
respect to a previously filed claim does not create a new 
occurrence because the existence of an occurrence is independent 
of claims filed against the insured.166 Therefore, the chain of 
uncertainty leading to higher medical costs is not aggravated by 
                                                                                                             
 159. Warren, 21 So. 3d at 207. 
 160. Firestone, supra note 15, at 1560. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. With an occurrences policy, the peril insured is the “occurrence,” or 
act of malpractice. Hood v. Cotter, 5 So. 3d 819, 826 (La. 2008). Once the 
occurrence happens, coverage attaches even though a claim has not been made. 
Id. But with a “claims made” policy, the peril insured is the making of the claim. 
Id. 
 163. Anderson v. Ichinose, 760 So. 2d 302, 305 (La. 1999). 
 164. See Firestone, supra note 15, at 1560. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See Anderson, 760 So. 2d at 305 (“Once the ‘occurrence’ takes place, 
coverage attaches even though the claim may not be made for some time 
thereafter.”). 
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allowing interruption of prescription or relation back, meaning the 
public interests behind the Act are not harmed. 
LeBreton recognized Taylor v. Giddens as determining that the 
prescriptive period for wrongful death claims is not set forth in 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:5628 but in Louisiana Civil 
Code article 3492.167 The references by both Justice Victory in 
Warren and Justice Weimer in Borel to the “purpose of the [Act]” 
may have been misplaced.168 Louisiana Revised Statutes sections 
40:1299.41–.49 do not establish a prescriptive period; they govern 
the procedure by which medical malpractice claims must be 
asserted and provide for suspension of prescription during and 
shortly after an MRP’s deliberations.169 Unless one includes 
section 9:5628 under the label of “the Act,”170 which might be 
reasonable because both cover the same general subject matter, one 
cannot honestly say that the purpose of the Act was to “curtail 
lengthy periods for filing malpractice suits by limiting application 
of the discovery rule of contra non valentem to a maximum of 
three years.”171 Rather, the purpose of the act (applicable to 
                                                                                                             
 167. LeBreton v. Rabito, 714 So. 2d 1226, 1229 (La. 1998); see LA. CIV. 
CODE ANN. art. 3492 (2011) (“Delictual actions are subject to a liberative 
prescription of one year.”). In Taylor v. Giddens, Justice Ortique wrote: 
The determination that the prescriptive period for wrongful death 
actions arising from acts of medical malpractice are not within the 
scope of [Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:5628], does not alter the 
affect [sic] that the Medical Malpractice Act . . . has on wrongful death 
actions. The actions continue to be governed and procedurally 
controlled by the provisions of the Act. Rather, because [section] 
9:5628 does not provide the prescriptive period for wrongful death 
actions, the commencement and running of its prescriptive period is 
controlled by the one year liberative period applicable to delictual 
actions, [Louisiana Civil Code article] 3492, and the action is available 
to the certain beneficiaries named in [Louisiana Civil Code article] 
2315.2 (formerly named in [Louisiana Civil Code article] 2315). 
Taylor v. Giddens, 618 So. 2d 834, 841 (La. 1993). 
 168. Warren v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co. 21 So. 3d 186, 207 (La. 2009) 
(quoting Borel v, Young, 989 So. 2d 42, 68 n.12 (alterations in original)). Also, 
in LeBreton, the Court was concerned with a plaintiff gaining an advantage by 
flaunting the MRP procedure. See LeBreton, 714 So. 2d at 1230. It seems 
obvious in that case that the purpose of section 40:1299.47 would have been 
subverted had the plaintiff been allowed to prevail but less so in Borel and 
Warren where the MRP procedure was properly followed. 
 169. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) (Supp. 2011). 
 170. The author notes that section 9:5628 was passed separately from 
sections 40:1299.41–.47. The former was passed under 1975 La. Acts, No. 808 
whereas section 40:1299.47 was enacted under 1975 La Acts. No. 817. See LA. 
REV. STAT ANN. § 9:5628 (2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47 (Supp. 
2011).  
 171. Borel, 989 So. 2d at 68 n.12. 
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prescription in wrongful death cases) was simply the purpose 
behind prescriptive statutes in general.172 
Nevertheless, the Warren case involved a wrongful death claim 
governed by the prescriptive period of Louisiana Civil Code article 
3492.173 Presumably, the purpose of article 3492 in relation to 
wrongful death claims is the same as it is for every other general 
delictual claim, since that is the subject matter of the article.174 
Because the relation back of general delictual claims under Ray 
and Giroir presumably does not offend the purpose of article 3492, 
it should not have been so held in Warren. 
Application of Warren could lead to the unjust result of a right 
of action for wrongful death prescribing before it ever accrues.175 
An action for wrongful death does not arise until a victim dies.176 
Even if the victim timely files suit for his or her own damages and 
then dies after the three-year limit of Louisiana Revised Statutes 
section 9:5628, Warren seems to indicate that the spouse’s or 
children’s wrongful death claim will have already prescribed and 
any amendment adding such a claim will not be allowed to relate 
back.177 This seems to be a type of injustice article 1153 was 
designed to prevent, and it is precisely the injustice the Taylor v. 
Giddens court contemplated when it wrote, “[s]uch a result is 
intolerable, as it discriminates among wrongful death tort 
claimants.”178  
Perhaps unsatisfied with simply eliminating interruption of 
prescription and barring relation back of amended pleadings in the 
medical malpractice context, Justice Victory reiterated from Borel 
that “we find that any general codal article which conflicts with 
these provisions may not be applied to such actions in the absence of 
specific legislative authorization in the Act. The Act has no rules 
allowing relation back of pleadings for medical malpractice 
claims.”179 Here, a provision with no analogue in the Medical 
                                                                                                             
 172. See supra Part I.C. 
 173. Warren, 21 So. 3d at 203; Taylor v. Giddens, 618 So. 2d 834, 841 (La. 
1993). 
 174. See LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 3492 (2011). See supra Part I.C. for a 
discussion of the purpose of liberative prescription. 
 175. See Taylor, 618 So. 2d at 841; Walls v. Am. Optical Corp., 740 So. 2d 
1262, 1273–74 (La. 1999); see also Hackenberg, supra note 13, at 838–40. 
 176. Walls, 740 So. 2d at 1273. 
 177. See Warren, 21 So. 3d at 207–08. 
 178. Taylor, 618 So. 2d at 841 (referring to discrimination between those 
victims who die before the three-year limit of section 9:5628 and those who die 
after). 
 179. Warren, 21 So. 3d at 207. 
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Malpractice Act was held to be in conflict.180 The extension of this 
logic makes it difficult to predict what other statutes are in conflict 
with the Act.181 For example, does Warren mean that 
acknowledgment of the obligation does not interrupt prescription?182 
The Act appears silent with respect to acknowledgment of medical 
malpractice obligations, save possibly in the case of waiver of the 
requirement for an MRP, where suspension continues for 90 days 
past the dismissal of the panel.183 Application of the Warren holding 
would seem to foreclose interruption by acknowledgment even 
when suspension of prescription ends 90 days after the panel issues 
its opinion. 
Without adequate explantion or justification, Warren further 
expanded LeBreton to block both interruption of prescription with 
respect to a plaintiff sharing the same cause of action and relation 
back of an amendment to a timely filed petition. This is two steps 
past the already untenable position of Borel. Moreover, the 
application of what seems to be the incorrect statute to the 
wrongful death claim in Warren created uncertainty where none 
should exist.184 
C. What Are the Side Effects? A Comparative Analysis 
The following hypothetical scenarios demonstrate the manner 
in which a narrow interpretation of LeBreton harmonizes the 
general rules of interruption of prescription with the suspension 
provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act, leading to just results. 
They also bring to light the unjust and presumably unintended 
consequences of the current broad view of LeBreton. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 180. Id. The provision in question was Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure 
article 1153. 
 181. See id. at 209 (on rehearing, Johnson, J., dissenting). 
 182. “Prescription is interrupted when one acknowledges the right of the 
person against whom he had commenced to prescribe.” LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 
3464 (2007). “Louisiana jurisprudence is settled that an acknowledgment 
interrupting liberative prescription may be oral or written, formal or informal, 
and express or tacit.” Id. at cmt. e. 
 183. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(A)(2)(c) (Supp. 2011). 
 184. Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:5628 as opposed to Louisiana Civil 
Code article 3492. It should be noted that Warren has been seen to have implicitly 
overruled Taylor. Guy v. Brown, 67 So. 3d 704, 706 (La. Ct. App. 2011).  
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1. Suit Against Non-Qualified Tortfeasor Before MRP Reviews 
Claim Against Qualified Health Care Provider 
Plaintiff Paul is injured in an auto accident caused by Tom and 
treated in a hospital where he believes he has suffered medical 
malpractice at the hands of qualified health care provider Dr. 
Quentin. Paul files suit against both Tom and Dr. Quentin, and 
later timely requests review of his claim against Dr. Quentin by an 
MRP. 
Under a narrow interpretation of LeBreton, prescription against 
Tom is interrupted because the claim against him does not arise in 
malpractice.185 However, prescription against Dr. Quentin is only 
suspended during the panel’s review and for 90 days thereafter.186 
Interruption with respect to Dr. Quentin occurs only if Paul brings 
suit against him between the time notification of the panel’s 
decision is received and the end of the prescriptive period.187 
Because interruption of prescription does not take place until after 
the MRP procedure, Paul receives no synergistic application of 
both suspension and interruption of prescription, which seemingly 
was the court’s desired result in LeBreton.188 
Under the broad interpretation espoused in Borel, Paul cannot 
enjoy interruption of prescription or relation back against Dr. 
Quentin under any circumstance.189 Even if the MRP reviewed 
claims against other solidary obligors qualified under the medical 
malpractice act (such as Dr. Quentin’s employer), Paul will be 
unable to amend his timely filed petition against Dr. Quentin to 
include claims against Dr. Quentin’s employer once the 
prescriptive period has run.190 This result flies in the face of 
Louisiana Civil Code article 2315, which calls for those at fault to 
repair damages they have caused.191 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 185. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3462 (2007). 
 186. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) (Supp. 2011); LeBreton 
v. Rabito, 714 So. 2d 1226, 1230–31 (La. 1998). 
 187. See discussion supra Part II.A.1–2. 
 188. See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
 189. See Borel v. Young, 989 So. 2d 42, 67 (La. 2008); Warren v. La. Med. 
Mut. Ins. Co., 21 So. 3d 186, 207–08 (La. 2009); see also discussion supra Parts 
II.A–B. 
 190. See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
 191. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (2010). 
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2. Suit Filed After MRP Procedure Is Complete 
Here, Paul files a request for review of his medical malpractice 
claim against Dr. Quentin before filing suit against Dr. Quentin 
and Tom. 
The narrow view of LeBreton would allow interruption of 
prescription against both Dr. Quentin and Tom because Paul 
waited until his claim against Dr. Quentin was mature.192 After 
Paul receives notification of the MRP’s opinion, interruption of 
prescription should be allowed because the greater effect of 
interruption subsumes the lesser effect of suspension.193 
Furthermore, allowing interruption against Dr. Quentin is 
reasonable because he received earlier notice of the claim than 
Tom, against whom interruption is allowed.194 Should Paul die as a 
result of the medical malpractice after the prescriptive period 
expires, Paul’s son Paul Jr. will not be prevented from asserting 
wrongful death and survival claims against Dr. Quentin through 
operation of prescription.195 This does not harm the state’s interests 
in a limited discovery period because allowing interruption and 
relation back does not create uncertainty with respect to 
occurrences.196 
The broad view of LeBreton refuses to apply interruption of 
prescription against Dr. Quentin and in favor of Paul Jr. regardless 
of whether the suit against the doctor complied with the MRP 
requirement.197 This is despite the lack of conflict in this situation 
between suspension of prescription provided in section 40:1299.47 
and interruption provided in the Civil Code.198 Should Paul die as a 
result of the medical malpractice after the prescriptive period has 
expired, Paul Jr. will be barred from asserting wrongful death and 
survival claims against Dr. Quentin because the claims prescribed 
before they accrued.199 
                                                                                                             
 192. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3462 (2007); see also discussion supra Part 
II.A.1. 
 193. See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
 194. See discussion supra Part II.B.3. Dr. Quentin received earlier notice 
than Tom as a result of the MRP procedure, which occurred before the suit was 
filed. Interruption of prescription is allowed against the non-qualified tortfeasor. 
See Coleman v. Acromed Corp., 764 So. 2d 81, 84 (La. Ct. App. 1999).  
 195. See discussion supra Part II.B.1–3. 
 196. See discussion supra Part II.B.3. 
 197. See Borel v. Young, 989 So. 2d 42, 67 (La. 2008); Warren v. La. Med. 
Mut. Ins. Co., 21 So. 3d 186, 207–08 (La. 2009); see also discussion supra Parts 
II.A–B. 
 198. See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
 199. See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
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3. Suit Is Premature with Respect to One Qualified Health 
Care Provider but Not the Other 
Here, Paul is treated by two qualified health care providers, Dr. 
Quentin and Dr. Quick. Paul was unconscious when Dr. Quick was 
operating on him and did not realize he was involved until later. 
Paul requested a review of his claim of malpractice against only 
Dr. Quentin by an MRP. After receiving notification of the panel’s 
opinion, Paul timely files suit against Dr. Quentin and Dr. Quick 
(having learned of Dr. Quick’s involvement). Dr. Quick files a 
dilatory exception of prematurity, arguing that because claims 
against him were not reviewed pursuant to section 40:1299.47, the 
action against him is premature. The court agrees, dismissing 
claims against Dr. Quick without prejudice.200 Unfortunately for 
Paul, the next day is the last day of the prescriptive period and he 
is unable to request an MRP to review his claims against Dr. 
Quick.201 
Here, the operation of the narrow and broad interpretations of 
LeBreton have the same effect with respect to Dr. Quick.202 
Suspension of prescription was in effect against Dr. Quick while 
the MRP reviewed claims against Dr. Quentin.203 However, suit 
against Dr. Quentin and Dr. Quick did not interrupt prescription 
against Dr. Quick. If it had, Paul would have had the benefit of 
both interruption and suspension of prescription against Dr. Quick, 
giving Paul and extra year to file suit after the MRP issued its 
opinion.204 
The above scenarios demonstrate how the narrow view of 
LeBreton brings harmony to the interaction of the general rules of 
prescription and the Medical Malpractice Act. It also balances the 
interests of medical malpractice claimants, defendants, and the 
state. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 200. See LeBreton v. Rabito, 714 So. 2d 1226, 1230 (La. 1998). 
 201. Paul would be able to make the request, but it would be fruitless 
because his claim has prescribed. If a request is made for an MRP review on a 
prescribed claim, the defendant can file a peremptory exception of prescription 
in any district court which must then dissolve the panel. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
40:1299.47(B)(2)(a)–(b) (Supp. 2011). 
 202. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 203. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) (Supp. 2011). 
 204. See LeBreton, 714 So. 2d at 1229–30; see also discussion supra Part 
II.A.1. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
The LeBreton holding, which in its narrowest application 
proscribes interruption of prescription only with respect to medical 
malpractice cases before the plaintiff is notified by the MRP of its 
opinion, has been expanded nearly past the point of recognition. 
Thanks to Warren, neither the general rules of prescription nor 
relation back of amended pleadings apply at any time during the 
adjudication of a medical malpractice case. The opinion may lead 
one to question whether any general codal rule of prescription 
applies. 
A narrow interpretation of LeBreton is in order, limiting it to its 
facts. Until the barrier of uninterruptible prescription is removed, 
victims of medical malpractice may remain subject to the bitter pill 
of “uncertain prescription” applied in the Borel and Warren cases. 
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